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Abstract
Prior studies show that IPO earnings forecasts are robustly related to the IPO initial market valuation and its
short-run performance (i.e., Chen, Firth, and Khrisnan, 2001; How and Yeo, 2001; Li and McConomy, 2004;
Keasey and McGuiness, 2008). This study investigates the impact of management earning forecasts on the
long run performance of IPOs in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). It hypothesizes that the relative accuracy,
which is revealed at the end of IPO year, will affect the pricing process in the market that in turn will affect the
IPO 1 year performance. Unlike most prior studies, this study uses relative forecast bias, as the direction of the
bias will have different impact on the IPO after-market performance. Using 94 IPOs that went public in 2000-
2008 in IDX, this study finds some interesting results. In general, the sample shows an average of negative
forecast bias. The upward bias IPOs has a better 1-year performance than the downward bias IPOs. They also
appear to have a higher initial performance. Finally, the cross section analysis result shows a robust evidence
to support the research hypothesis that the relative accuracy of management earnings forecast is positively
related to the IPO 1-year performance.
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There have been many studies show the pivotal
role of management earnings forecast in valuing
IPO (i.e., Chen, Firth, and Khrisnan, 2001; How
and Yeo, 2001; Li and McConomy, 2004; Keasey
and McGuiness, 2008). Most studies find that dis-
closing earnings forecast in IPO prospectus does
put different impact on IPOs early market price.
Other scholars examine the impact of earnings fore-
cast disclosure on the IPO initial market perfor-
mance (i.e, Firth, 1998).
The other stream of the management earn-
ings forecast research is to evaluate the accuracy
of the forecasts at the end of IPO year. Some ex-
amines the factors affecting the accuracy (i.e, Jagi,
1997) and others observe the association between
the accuracy and the IPO performance (Jelic,
Saadouni, & Briston, 1998).
In some markets, such as, Hong Kong, Ma-
laysia, China, Taiwan, earnings forecast disclosure
is a mandatory disclosure in the IPO prospectus.
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While in other market, such as UK, Australia,
Canada, Korea, including Indonesia, it is a volun-
tary disclosure. In a market with tirghter legal en-
vironment, such as US, the SEC does not encour-
age the issuers to disclose their earnings forecast.
This study is to investigate the impact of the
earnings forecast bias on the IPO after-market
performance. To authors’ knowledge, this is
among the first study of IPO management earn-
ings forecast and its relation to the IPO perfor-
mance in Indonesia. Prior study using Indonesia
IPO data examines the determinants of the man-
agement forecasts accuracy (Siauw, Hutagaol, &
Ekaputra, 2008). This study differs to prior stud-
ies in several points. Firstly, most studies in this
field examine the influence of forecast bias on the
short-run performance, while this study focuses
on the IPO after-market performance (1 year after
IPO). Secondly, instead of absolute forecast errors,
the study uses relative forecast bias (errors). The
motivation is by using relative bias, we could ana-
lyze different impacts of upward bias (positive
errors) and downward bias (negative errors) on
the IPO performance. Thirdly, as mentioned ear-
lier, in most developing markets in Asia such as,
China, Taiwan, Malaysia, earnings forecast disclo-
sure is mandatory, while in Indonesia, it is a vol-
untary disclosure. This study provides evidence
of IPO earnings forecast behaviour in a voluntary
disclosure and low litigation environment. More-
over, although disclosing earnings forecasts is
voluntary, more than 60% issuers disclosed man-
agement earnings forecast in their IPO prospec-
tuses during year 2000-2008.
Prior Studies
Lev & Penman (1990) argue that earnings
forecasts are used by managers of “good news”
firms to screen themselves out from other firms.
In this argument, it could be said that manage-
ment earnings forecast is used as a signal to the
firm value. Trueman (1986) states in the voluntary
disclosure setting, the managers would be moti-
vated to release earnings forecasts if such actions
leads to higher firm market value.
Empirical evidence show strong support to
Trueman (1986). In UK market, Keasye and
McGuinees (1991) find that IPOs that disclose earn-
ing forecast are differently valued in the market
on their initial trading day compared to their coun-
terparts. Disclosing earnings forecast is perceived
as a signaling tool that has a positive impact on
the firm initial market value. The similar findings
are also found in Australia (How & Yeo, 2001),
Thailand (Jog & McConomy, 2003). This robust
finding is found in both voluntary and mandatory
environments.
If the earnings forecasts have high explana-
tory power to the IPO initial market value, it could
be expected that it provides some explanation to
the IPO stylish fact, underpricing. Unlike the ro-
bust findings in the initial market valuation, the
empirical evidence on the initial returns is mixed.
Using Hong Kong data, Keasey & McGuiness
(2008) finds that IPOs that disclose earnings fore-
cast are less underpriced than thier counterparts.
This implies that disclosing earnings forecast in
the IPO forecast could reduce the information
assymetry in the market. This results in more ac-
curate market price. Firth (1998) finds that fore-
casted errors are negatively related to the under-
pricing level. However, some studies do not find
significant evidence to support the hypothesis (i.e.,
How & Yeo, 2001). This study contributes to the
research area by focusing the impact of the earn-
ings forecast on the long term performance.
Another research are of IPO earnings fore-
cast discusses about the accuracy of the forecasts.
Chen, et al. (2001) argue that management fore-
cast is more accurate than other forecasts, such as
random walk and interpolation forecasts. They
find robust findings to support the hypothesis.
Evidence on the IPO earnings forecast accuracy
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reveals the absolute forecast errors varies among
the countries. Harnett & Romcke (2000) summa-
rize nine IPO studies and find that the forecast
accuracy varies across firm age, size, forecast in-
terval, industry, leverage, agent quality, and other
factors. Firth & Smith (1992) find that company
size had an unanticipated positive relationship with
forecast errors. Lee, et al. (1993) reported posi-
tive relationships between the time horizon of the
forecast and absolute forecast errors. Chan, et al.
(1996) find that low profit variability and smaller
changes in economic growth accompany small
forecast errors. Jaggi (1997) shows that older com-
panies were associated with smaller errors.
Jaggi, et al. (2006) finds that the IPO earn-
ings forecast is more accurate, which results in low
forecast errors, after it becomes mandatory in
Taiwanese market. However, further analysis
shows that the low errors in the mandatory envi-
ronment in Taiwan are a result of increasing earn-
ing management practices to meet the earnings
forecasts. Jaggi, et al. (2006) examines the effect of
the forecasts to manager behavior to anticipate the
errors. They use the relative forecast errors to
make a differentiation between the optimistic and
the conservative forecasters, then, observe the
manager behavior in earnings management. This
study also uses relative forecast errors to differ-
entiate the upward bias and downward bias pro-
ducer, and its effect on the investor pricing deci-
sion in the long-run
DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD
The research sample covers all companies
that went public in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)
during the 2000-2008 period. There were 153 IPOs
conducted during the period, however, consider-
ing not all issuers disclose earning forecast in the
prospectus, the sample is reduced to 96 IPOs. Two
IPOs that produced extreme earnings forecast er-
rors are excluded; therefore this concludes the fi-
nal sample to 94 IPOs. The yearly sample distribu-
tion is shown in table 1 below.
Table 1. Sample Distribution By Year
Forecast bias (FER) is measured by the per-
centage of forecast deviation to the actual earn-
ings. Positive (negative) FER means that actual
earnings are greater (lower) than forecasted earn-
ings. Positive (negative) FER is, then, perceived
as upward (downward) bias. Mathematically, FE
is expressed as follows,
Where,
FERi = Forecast bias IPO i.
AEi = Actual earnings IPO i at the end of finan-
cial IPO year
FEi = Forecasted earnings IPO i disclosed in the
prospectus
This study investigates the impact of fore-
casted bias on the IPO 1-year performance. The
IPO performance is measured by cumulative ab-
normal returns (CAR), which is an accumulation
of monthly abnormal returns up to 1 year after
IPO. The abnormal return is the difference be-
tween IPO returns and the market returns. CAR
is measured by the equation below,
Year IPOs IPOs that Disclose Earnings Forecasts 
2000 20 13 
2001 31 27 
2002 22 15 
2003 9 4 
2004 12 9 
2005 8 6 
2006 11 8 
2007 23 12 
2008 17 2 
FERi
AEi - FEi=
FEi
(1)
∑ CARi  =
1 2
t=1
ARi,t (2)
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Where,
CARi = Cumulative abnormal return IPO i.
ARi,t = Abnormal returns IPO i, in month t
FE = Forecasted earnings disclosed in the IPO
prospectus
Since prior IPO studies (i.e, Ritter (1991), Lee,
et al (1996) Yi (2001)) show that there is a consis-
tent relationship between the first day initial re-
turns (IR) and the IPO long-run performance, this
study employs IR as a control variable in examin-
ing the impact of FER on CAR. As explained in
prior sections, there are some other control vari-
ables that are found to be related to the IPO long-
run performance. They are used in the research
model as control variables. The variables are com-
pany size, percentage of share retained by old
shareholders at IPO, auditor reputation, and in-
dustry. The research model to analyze the impact
of IPO forecasted bias and its long-run perfor-
mance is expressed as follows,
IND = Industry dummy. Financial industry is as-
signed 1, otherwise 0
RESULT
Table 2 shows some summary statistics relat-
ing to the research sample. It shows that on aver-
age, the IPO sample generates -17.66% forecast bias,
which is significant different to zero at α  = 1%.
The sample also produces a median of -12.49%
forecast bias, which is significant different to zero
at α  = 5%. About 68% sample produced negative
FERs. This indicates that more than half of IPO
firms during the research period are aggressive in
their forecast behavior.
Table 2 also shows that the research sample
is underpriced on average of 35.55%. This result
is consistent to many IPO studies on the under-
pricing, including in Indonesia (Rahman &
Hutagaol, 2008). The 1-year after IPO performance
has an average of -3.2% compared to the market.
This indicates that within 1 year after the floating,
IPOs are underperformed the market. However,
the statistical t-test confirms that the mean of CAR
is not different to zero at α  = 5%. The long-run
underperformance of the sample is consistent to
prior IPO study in Indonesia (Rahman & Hutagaol,
2008).
There are not many variations in the firm
size of the sample and the percentage of shares
retained by old shareholders. It is shown by the
low standard deviation compared to the mean
statistics of the variables. Regarding the industries,
about 31% of sample is firms in financial industries.
Where,
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return
FER = Forecast bias
IR = IPO initial returns on the 1st trading day
SIZE = normal log of company net assets after the
IPO
RET = percentage of shares retained by old share-
holders at the IPO
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
FER -0.1766 -0.1249 0.6120 -3.6481 1.9830 
CAR -0.03202 -0.1203 0.8484 -2.6848 2.7980 
IR 0.3555 0.2046 0.7615 -0.8750 4.8000 
SIZE 11.1025 10.9755 0.5689 9.8604 13.2011 
PERCENT 0.7537 0.7639 0.1044 0.5000 0.9303 
IND 0.3085 0 0,464355 - - 
 
Table 2. Summary of Statistics Descriptive
CAR = β 0+β 1FER+β 2IR+β 3SIZE+β 4PERCENT+
β 5IND          (3)
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In order to analyze the impact of the rela-
tive accuracy of the management earnings fore-
cast, we divide the sample into 2 groups; the posi-
tive forecast (upward) bias IPOs and the negative
forecast (downward) bias IPOs. Table 3 presents
the tests results of mean difference of those 2
groups for all research variables.
Table 3. Results of Mean Difference Tests between Upward
and Downward Bias IPOs
IPO prominent signal (the percentage of shares
retained by old shareholders). Table 3 shows that
there are no significant differences in SIZE and
PERCENT among the IPOs. This result confirms
the descriptive statistics figures of these two vari-
ables that demonstrate little variation.
It is expected that financial firms are more
conservative in their forecasts due to the industry
heavy regulation. However, table 3 shows that
there are more financial firms in the downward
bias group than in the upward bias group, though
the difference is trivial, and appears to be statisti-
cally insignificant.
To examine the impact of the forecast errors
on the IPO long-run performance, this study uses
regression analysis as expressed in equation 3.
Table 4 presents the regression results for the IPO
long-run performance model.
Table 4. Regression Analysis on Forecast Errors and IPO Long-
run Performance
Variables 
Mean of upward 
bias IPOs 
(30 IPOs) 
Mean of downward 
bias IPOs 
(64 IPOs) 
Mean 
difference 
t-test (p-value) 
IR 0.4683 
 
0.3028 
 
1.0267 
(0.1542) 
CAR 0.1975 
 
-0.1396 
 
1.8020** 
(0.0384) 
SIZE 11.2111 
 
11.0516 
 
1.1348 
(0.1313) 
PERCENT 0.7430 
 
0.7587 
 
-0.6846 
(0.2481) 
IND 0.3000 
 
0.3125 
 
-0.1211 
(0.4520) 
 Notes: ** significant at α =5%
From all variables, only CARs between the
two groups that are different significantly at α =5%.
The result shows that the upward bias IPOs has
an average positive 1-year abnormal return, while
the downward bias IPOs has an average negative
1-year abnormal return. It implies that the upward
bias IPOs tend to outperform the market in the
long-run, while the downward bias IPOs tend to
underperform the market.
While in the long-run, the two groups show
a significant different performance, that is not the
case in the short-run. Both groups generate posi-
tive initial returns meaning that both groups are
underpriced on the 1st trading day. The upward
bias IPOs have a higher initial return (46.83%) than
the downward bias IPOs do (30.28%). It reflects
that on their early trading days, IPOs of the up-
ward bias IPOs are, relatively, valued higher in
the market, compared to the IPOs of the aggres-
sive forecaster.
It is expected that forecast behavior differ-
ence could be characterized by firm size and the
Variable Coefficient t-stat (p-value) 
Constant 1.9181 0.8924 
(0.3749) 
FER 0.4019 2.2364* 
(0.0291) 
IR -0.5656 -4.5984** 
(0.0000) 
SIZE -0.1491 -0.7405 
(0.4620) 
PERCENT -0.0131 
 
-0.0143 
(0.9886) 
IND -0.2128 
 
-1.0658 
(0.2909) 
Adjusted R2 0.2537  
F-stat  
(p-value) 
5.2831** 
(0.0005) 
 
 
Notes: *significant at α = 5%; **significant at α =10%;
Equation 3:
CAR = β 0+β 1FER+β 2IR+β 3SIZE+β 4PERCENT+β 5IND
Where: CAR = cumulative abnormal return of IPOs; FER = the
percentage of forecast bias given by equation 1; IR = the percent-
age of IPO return on the 1st trading day; SIZE = normal log of net
asset after IPO; PERCENT = the percentage of shares retained by
old shareholders at IPO; IND = a dummy variable for industry
take 1 for financial firm, and 0 otherwise.
Table 4 shows that the research model ex-
plains about 25.37% of the variability of the explana-
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tory variables. The model is valid and statistically
significant at á=10%. The result shows that forecast
bias (FER) is positively related to the IPO long-run
performance. It suggests that the higher the bias,
the higher the IPO performance 1 year after IPO.
Higher FER, here, should be understood in man-
agement behavior context. Higher FER means that
actual earnings are higher than forecasted earnings,
that results in positive FER (upward bias), and vice
versa.
Table 4 also shows that IR is negatively re-
lated to the IPO 1 year performance. This implies
that IPO that are underpriced in the 1st trading day
will be corrected in the long-run which, then, re-
sults in lower price, 1 year after IPO. The control
variables (SIZE, PERCENT, and IND) have unex-
pected sign. This study expects that there are posi-
tive association between SIZE, PERCENT, IND and
IPO 1-year returns. The first two are usual explana-
tory variables used in explaining the IPO perfor-
mance. IND is a control variable for financial firms,
that are usually valued differently by the market.
All shows negative coefficients, although they are
statistically insignificant.
DISCUSSION
The negative forecast bias found in this study
is similar to previous studies in Australia (How &
Yeo, 2001) and Hong Kong (Chen, et al., 2000) that
also find a mean of negative forecast bias. How-
ever, this is different to results in other markets,
such as in China (Chen and Firth, 1998), Malaysia
(Jelic, et al, 1998), and Singapore (Firth, et al, 1995).
The underlying difference between the results is
on the disclosure regulation. As explained in the
beginning of this paper, earnings forecast disclo-
sure in IPO prospectus is mandatory in countries
like China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, while in
other countries such as Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, including Indonesia, such disclosure is
voluntary. It suggests that there is a different man-
agement behavior towards earning forecast in a
different disclosure regulation.
Despite the significant difference of manage-
ment earnings forecast bias between the upward
bias IPOs and the downward bias IPOs, the firm
characteristics (firm size, percentage of shares re-
tained at the IPOs, and industry) between the two
groups are similar. Firm characteristics do not re-
late to the accuracy of management earnings fore-
cast. However, the finding shows that it is related
to the long-run market performance. The finding
shows the 1 year performance of the upward bias
IPOs is significantly higher than the performance
of the downward bias IPOs. This result gives an
insight that market might have anticipated the man-
agers behavior on IPO earnings forecasts, as found
by Chen & Firth (1999). It shows that after the earn-
ings forecast bias is revealed at then of the fiscal
year, the investors are disappointed with the re-
sult of downward bias IPOs, then, they revise their
valuation, which results in lower performance, rela-
tively, to the valuation of the upward bias IPOs.
The analysis of the research model shows that
the relative accuracy of forecast bias is positively
related to the 1-year IPO performance. It implies
that, in the long-run, the market rewards the firms
that generate positive forecast bias at the IPO. When
the FE is revealed at the end of financial year of
IPO, market reacts accordingly. When FE is “good
news” – actual earnings tend to achieve or beat the
forecast, which results in upward bias – market re-
wards it with higher IPO returns. When FE is “bad
news” – actual earnings tend to be failed or lower
than the forecast, which result in downward – mar-
ket is disappointed, which is shown by lower IPO
returns. This result provides strong evidence to the
hypothesis of this research.
This result confirms findings by Firth (1998)
and How & Yeo (2001). Using different measures
of forecast accuracy, they conclude that the fore-
cast bias is positively related to the IPO 1 year per-
formance. Indirectly, this result also supports other
findings (Chen & Firth, 1999) show that earnings
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forecast at the IPO, is still relevant to the IPO pric-
ing 1 year after the IPO.
The next result shows a negative relationship
between the short-run and long-run performance.
It implies that the more underpriced IPOs on the
early trading days will have lower valuation after
1 year traded. This is consistent with the over-re-
action hypothesis stating that the underpriced IPOs
is caused by investors’ over-reaction on the early
trading days. In the long-run, investors will adjust
their valuation, which results in the under-perfor-
mance. This result also confirms prior studies on
the relationship between the short-run and long-
run performance of the IPO (i.e. Ritter, 1991).
The insignificant result of control variables
(firm size, percentage of shares retained, and in-
dustry) could be explained as follows. The control
variables are known to the market on the 1st trad-
ing day, therefore they should have been incorpo-
rated on the initial returns. However, they become
irrelevant to 1-year after IPO valuation; therefore
they appear to be insignificant to the IPO 1-year
performance.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of the man-
agement forecast bias on the IPO long-run perfor-
mance. The forecast bias is revealed when the ac-
tual earnings is announced at the end of IPO finan-
cial year. Unlike prior studies in the field, this study
uses the relative forecast bias instead of the abso-
lute forecast bias. Using this measure allows re-
searchers to analyze the different impact of the bias
direction on the IPO performance.
This study finds that 68% of IPO sample gen-
erate downward bias meaning that the actual earn-
ings do not achieve the target. There is a signifi-
cant performance difference between the upward
bias and the downward bias IPOs. The upward bias
IPOs show a better performance in the initial and
1-year performance. However, only the difference
in 1-year performance appears to be statistically sig-
nificant.
Moreover, this study finds that the forecast
bias is positively related to the IPO 1-year perfor-
mance. It shows that market do reward IPOs that
achieve or exceeds the earnings forecast. Further-
more, the forecast bias, here, could also indicate
the management behavior in earnings forecast at
the IPOs. The upward bias indicates the managers
take the conservative standpoint, while the down-
ward bias indicates that the managers take the ag-
gressive stand point. So, the result shows that mar-
ket do reward the conservatives more than the ag-
gressive. This result confirms findings by Firth
(1998) and How & Yeo (2001).
Suggestions
The study result has several implications to
the regulation bodies. Since the result shows that
the relative forecast accuracy affects the IPO per-
formance in the long-run, it is suggested that earn-
ings forecast disclosed in the prospectus should be
verified by the firms’ auditors and the IPO under-
writers. The verification statement should be en-
closed in the prospectus. BAPEPAM might also re-
quest the forecast method should be disclosed in
the prospectus. Such disclosures would help inves-
tors to analyze the accuracy of management fore-
cast, before they price the IPOs.
The result shows that the impact of relative
accuracy of the management forecasts on the in-
vestors’ reaction. However, before the forecast bias
is revealed at the end of fiscal year, the manage-
ment should have known whether the target fore-
cast number will be achieved or not. Based on this
assumption, it could be inferred that there is an in-
centive for managers to manage their earnings so
that the end of year earnings figure closer to the
forecast. This could be a new avenue to investigate
the impact of management earnings forecast accu-
racy on the earnings management.
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